This more cooperative spirit is new, and it is therefore hard to assess its long-term impact. Yet, anyone interested in regime transition can discern an emerging pattern that is worthy of notice.
13 Recent developments in the Nile Basin provide an opportunity to consider the processes that surround the emergence and evolution of regimes. In particular, these developments provide a unique opportunity for international lawyers to examine the role of legal norms in these processes and to apply the rich theoretical insights that have emerged from recent literature in the fields of international relations (IR) and international law. The goal of this essay is to tease out factors that have contributed to nascent regime change in the Nile Basin. The essay catalogues a variety of explanatory factors. Its most controversial argument is that evolving legal norms have influenced this change; but not through the creation of predictable rules and institutional structures, as international relations (IR) scholars often posit.
14 Throughout the evolution of the Nile Basin regime, legal norms have been influential and have both hindered and promoted cooperation. Building upon a previous description of "contextual regimes,"
15 this essay will suggest that the evolving normative framework for shared freshwater has helped to redefine both the identities and interests of key state actors in the Nile Basin, moving them more recently towards more cooperative behavior. The essay flows directly from the overview provided by Professor Allan earlier in this volume, wherein he emphasises the social and political factors that influence water policy. Indeed, this essay is a concrete demonstration of the truth of the marvelous epigram offered up by Allan: "Constructed knowledge has just as much political purchase as probablistic science." 16 The approach adopted here draws on the interactional legal theory of Lon Fuller. Fuller understands law not as hierarchical ordering but as an ongoing generative activity, oriented towards the construction of relatively stable patterns of practices and normative expectations. Rules are persuasive and legal systems are seen as legitimate to the extent that they are consistent with this background of practices and expectations. Many of the central insights regarding the role of law in the Nile Basin are also gleaned from extending the analysis of IR constructivists such as Kratochwil, Onuf, Ruggie, and Wendt, into the discipline of international law. 13 What is happening in the Nile Basin is especially important as the mood amongst water specialists and diplomats alike is undeniably gloomy when considering the state of freshwater resources around the world. 91 AJIL 26 (1997) , at 28, 36-37 [hereinafter Regime Building] (describing "contextual regimes" as nascent frameworks that shape interaction and facilitate normative evolution along a continuum from shared expectations to norms in a more precise, legal sense). 16 J.A. Allan, "TITLE", THIS VOLUME, Page???. ADD.
The first part of the essay briefly reviews the linkages between constructivism and the "interactional theory of international law." 17 The second part provides an overview of the hydrological and geographic context of the Nile Basin. A third section details the social and political context, including the weak legal framework that has fostered the historical evolution of a purely competitive regime of freshwater in the Nile Basin. The fourth part of the essay extends the empirical examination to highlight recent moves towards greater cooperation and canvasses various factors promoting regime change. The fifth and final part posits findings concerning the role of international legal norms in helping to explain significant political change. In so doing, the essay assesses the contributions of the historic treaties governing the Nile Basin, of international water law, including the new UN Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses 18 , and of various informal institutions designed to promote cooperation among Nile riparians.
Within the last decade, the legal framework has been recast in ways that seem more conducive to cooperation in the Nile Basin. The hypothesis underlying this essay is that law's influence derives from three interrelated characteristics. First, law has the power to influence the individual and collective identities of states. Second, law both enables and constrains international discourse by establishing what counts as persuasive argument or rhetoric. Further, its inherent and specific form of legitimacy enhances the persuasiveness of law's postulates. This hypothesis is founded upon a particular theoretical construct of law and politics, which will be set out in summary form before turning to the fascinating case of the Nile Basin Regime.
Constructivism and Interactional Legal Theory

19
One of the greatest challenges to theories of international relations in the last century was how to explain major political change. The challenge is particularly pointed with respect to the shifting Nile Basin regime. Two broad streams of IR theory, neo-realism and neoliberalism, have dominated the disciplinary debate. In a neo-realist framework, states are seen as homogenous actors that proceed on the basis of rationally assessed and pursued self-interest.
20 Participation in a regime or adherence to a norm occurs if the net benefits outweigh those of unilateral action. Regimes and norms are seen as reflections of underlying power and interest balances rather than as independent factors influencing behavior. While neo-liberal IR theory, particularly institutionalism, is also rooted in rationalist assumptions, states are not assumed to be homogenous actors. Rather, states must be understood, at least partly, in relation to the institutions in which they are 17 See Interactional International Law, supra note 14. 
engaged.
21 Ultimately, however, both approaches treat actors and their interests as separate from processes of interaction, as largely 'given. ' 22 Engagement in institutions may affect their behavior but not the 'givens' as such.
23
Rationalist IR theory, almost by definition, attributes to law a highly limited role in influencing state behavior. Law, like other social norms, can provide predictable rules and stable institutional structures. 24 However, most IR theory devotes little time to distinguishing legal and non-legal norms nor to attributing distinctive effect to the former. 25 This view has been supported by the predominantly positivistic stance of the discipline of law itself. This stance has significant implications for efforts, by IR theorists and legal theorists alike, to understand how norms function in international society. If law is understood as a hierarchical exercise in social control derived from a de facto sovereign, 26 a grundnorm, 27 or a rule of recognition, 28 the horizontal nature of international law is problematic. International law either does not exist at all or is 21 See ROBERT 384 (1994) (discussing "rationalist two-step" in which "first interests are formed outside the interaction context, and then the latter is treated as though it only affected behavior"). 23 . 24 Institutionalist regime theory describes regimes as sets of "implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge" in a given issue area. Stephen 26 See 1 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 86 -103 (5th ed. 1885) (noting that for the command to be law it must also be "general" and matched with a potential sanction in the event of non-compliance). 27 See HANS KELSEN, GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND STATE (1961); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1952) . Kelsen sought to explain international law as a logical, unified structure, in which the validity of all rules can be traced back to one basic norm (grundnorm)--the idea that states are required to behave as they had customarily behaved. 28 PHILOSOPHY (1983) . Although Hart distanced himself from Austin's claim that law was whatever the sovereign commanded and could enforce, his conception of law remained hierarchical. Primary rules (imposing obligations) were seen as anchored in secondary rules (of recognition, change, and adjudication), and the legal system itself as anchored in an overarching power-legitimizing "rule of recognition." epiphenomenal, as realists would conclude, or it must be distorted to fit into the positivist framework, as much legal theory has done to justify international law as "real" law.
29
One possible starting point for breaking out of this self-fulfilling program for law's ineffectiveness is constructivist IR theory, 30 which emerged in part as a reaction to the dominant rationalist explanatory models.
31 Like institutionalists, constructivists focus on interaction, communication, and discourse among actors.
32 The distinctive features of constructivist theory are its rejection of the assumption of interests as exogenous to interaction and its focus on the identities of the actors (including states) as generators of interests.
33 The main point is that identity formation is relational and prior to interest formation.
34 Identities are constructed through social interaction. The ends of the interaction are not predetermined but can be discovered and learned. Structures such as institutions, norms, and rules, are not immutable but can be recast through changes in actor identity, which, in turn, are influenced by interaction and mutually created structures.
35 Constructivists describe how structures foster "shared understandings" that can then shape both the identity of the actors and the further evolution of the structures themselves.
36 This emphasis on the shaping of identities contains a further important insight: ideas, shared understandings, or norms are seen not as direct causes of behavior but as structures that both constrain and enable choices.
37 This conception opens new vistas on the role of international law as neither simply imposed social control nor as completely subordinate to the interests of states. Rather, law is seen as generated and molded through interaction and, in turn, as affecting actor behavior by influencing actor identity, thereby reconstructing interests. 29 . Interaction includes bilateral and multilateral intercourse amongst diverse international actors, mostly states, but increasingly--at least in some issue areas such as human rights, environmental law, and trade--involving actors from civil society and private business. 33 Wendt, supra note 22, passim. Although constructivists need to produce more empirical work demonstrating the role that identity plays in shaping actor behavior, Wendt has postulated a useful distinction between "type identities" (social categories of states that share characteristics such as regime type: liberal democracy, traditional monarchy, totalitarian dictatorship) and "role identities" (the product of relationships amongst states: friend, rival, enemy are the clearest categories 397 -398 (1992) . 35 See Risse, supra note 32, at 4 -5. 36 Ruggie, supra note 22, at 869 -70; Wendt, supra note 34, at 396 -97. 37 See Ruggie, id. at 869 -70.
Within legal theory, one of the richest repositories of insights to assist international lawyers in re-conceiving the role of law in international society is found in the writings of Lon Fuller. 38 Fuller's work has much common ground with constructivism in that it articulates an interactional understanding of law. Law is seen as evolving through social practice --a continuing challenge rather than a finished product.
39
Law is not by definition hierarchical, but is a construction dependent upon mutual generative activity.
40
Through interaction, relatively stable patterns of expectation ("shared understandings," in constructivist terms) must emerge to allow the application of norms in specific contexts.
41 Ultimately, rules are persuasive and legal systems are perceived as legitimate when they are broadly congruent with the practices and shared understandings in society.
42 These shared understandings create a framework for a rich conception of rhetorical activity whereby actors in a social system can be convinced of the need for legal norms.
43 As well, actors learn to read the social context against which particular legal norms must be postulated and interpreted.
44
For Fuller, there are certain internal characteristics that distinguish law from other forms of social ordering. They may be summarized as requiring that rules be compatible with one another, that they ask reasonable things, that they are transparent and relatively predictable, and that known rules actually guide the discretion of officials.
45 It is these internal characteristics that account for the 'binding' quality of law, rather than hierarchical authority or pedigree. The greater the extent to which these characteristics are present the greater the legitimacy of the norms or legal system and the greater law's power to promote adherence. 46 The criteria, and the resulting legitimacy of law, are 38 See One of his most controversial theses was that law is recognizable by adhering to these eight requirements of "internal morality," and by subjecting its substantive conclusions to weak tests of "external morality." Because of his emphasis upon "internal morality," one can conclude that Fuller believed that the basis of legal obligation is found within the system of rules itself, and is not dependent upon an external validating principle. Adherence to an internal morality helps to render law more legitimate in the eyes of those to whom rules are directed. In addition, modest substantive commitments to external morality evidence an underlying congruence with commonly shared understandings in society, which also tends to support the legitimacy of rules. 46 Id. at 46 -91, 155 (asserting "[T]he internal morality of the law is not something added to, or imposed on, the power of law, but is an essential condition of that power itself.") These tests are not perfect and other formulations would be plausible, but the purpose here is to stress Fuller's interactional thesis, not his commitment to a specific formulation of the internal morality of the law. See also Roderick A. Macdonald, largely related to the "process" of law creation; the tests remain neutral as to substantive goals pursued by the system. However, it is important to stress that "means" (process) and "ends" (substance) are not radically distinct. In an interactional model of law, process is part of the ends that law serves. 47 The binding effect of law is achieved essentially through self-bindingness, created in processes of mutual construction, legitimacy gained by adherence to internal criteria, and congruence with existing social norms, practices, and aspirations.
The implications of such an interactional understanding of law for the role of law in the context of the shared waters of the Nile Basin are significant. It is the prevailing anemic conception of law that drives the conclusion of many commentators that international law has little to contribute to the relations among basin states with respect to Nile waters. 48 An understanding of law that would posit its direct impact upon state behavior in the absence of underlying congruence with shared expectations is misconceived. If one's expectation of law is that by its mere formal existence (as an enunciated "rule") it can directly cause behavior, then one would inevitably conclude that international water law has been ineffective in the Nile context. Conversely, if one attributes no independent effect to law, as realists would, or sees it mainly as a device to coordinate interstate relations and make them more efficient, as institutionalists might, then international law's role is confined to the mere formalizing of Nile agreements once reached. By contrast, an interactional view of law can lead to a better understanding of both the promise and the limitations of law in the Nile context. Specifically, this essay traces three distinct but interrelated facets of law's persuasiveness: how it shapes the individual and collective identities of states, how it enables or constrains convincing arguments, and how it promotes adherence through its specific form of legitimacy. The essay examines each of these facets in relation to the historic Nile treaties, international water law (in particular as manifested in the Watercourses Convention), and various informal institutions involving Nile riparians.
Hydrological and Geographical Context of the Nile Basin
The Nile is one of the world's great rivers, flowing for 6,825 kilometers through much of Northeastern Africa, draining approximately 2.9 million square kilometers of territory, and nourishing roughly 280 million people in ten riparian states. The geographic and AND INSTITUTIONS 22 (1995) . For Fuller, the conditions of internal morality are genuinely moral, not mere desiderata of coherence or logical soundness, because they are both means and ends. In an interactional model of law, process is part of the ends that law serves because inclusive processes reinforce the commitments of participants in the system to the substantive outcomes achieved by implicating participants in their generation. 48 See infra notes 173-176 and accompanying text.
climatic setting of the Basin is varied, ranging from tropical rain forest to mountains, plateaus, and deserts. Roughly 85% of the Nile's water originates in the highlands of Ethiopia from which three rivers flow into the main body of the Nile: the Blue Nile, draining Lake Tana, and the Atbara and Sobat Rivers (through Eritrea and Sudan, and Ethiopia and Sudan, respectively). The remainder of the water flows along the White Nile from Central and East Africa, originating in Lake Victoria (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania) and the mountains of Burundi, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The White Nile flows through and feeds the great Sudanese swamps (The Sudd). The White Nile and Blue Nile meet at Khartoum, the former "clear and limpid" and the latter carrying "the fertilizing lime which in the past has been so helpful to Sudan and to Egypt."
49 From Khartoum, the Nile is a single river, flowing through Egypt on its way to the Mediterranean Sea.
50
Although "flow" statistics for the Nile can be quite imprecise for a number of technical reasons, it is fair to conclude that annual flow of the Nile, measured at Aswan in Egypt, has diminished significantly over the last century.
51 The river is also highly seasonal, with roughly 80% of its discharge occurring between August and October.
52 Many scientists believe that with the completion of the Aswan High Dam, and the creation of the huge reservoir known as Lake Nasser, controlled discharge has saved Egypt both from major floods and from major droughts.
53 However, as a result of the same project, only about 2% of the Nile's flow actually reaches the sea.
54 Such low flow levels have contributed to ecological problems that have reached crisis proportions. In a number of Nile riparians, a further problem is presented by poor water distribution. For example, it is reported that in Ethiopia roughly forty million hectares of land are drought prone and 540,000 hectares are flood prone. 60 Water planners describe a country as "water scarce" when annual renewable freshwater is less than 1,000 cubic meters per person per year. By this measure, as of 1990, Burundi, Kenya, and Rwanda were already subject to water scarcity. Egypt and Ethiopia are expected to fall into that category by 2025, and Tanzania and Uganda will join the group by 2050.
61 Sudan, because of its limited population in relation to its size, its relatively accessible flood region, and its endowment of enough rain to sustain significant rain-based food production, is not expected to face the effects of water scarcity in the near future. by upper riparians could have a significant negative impact on the Nile's flow into Sudan and Egypt, altering the current political equation enormously. 63 In addition, climate change could well contribute to a speeding up of the processes giving rise to water scarcity throughout the Nile Basin.
64
A further troubling problem faces Egypt, the downstream riparian and the state most dependent on the Nile: pollution of the river and other negative environmental effects of water development choices made over the last few decades. 65 The high use of pesticides and fertilizers in the Nile valley, and particularly in Egypt, has caused pollution of the river through the leaching of chemicals from the soil. 66 The level of pollution has also been exacerbated by the inability to manage the industrial, domestic, and agricultural waste produced by a fast-burgeoning population.
67 The building of the Aswan High Dam in 1963 had many positive results, but for almost forty years, the Dam "has kept the river from flooding and depositing renewing sediment at its mouth. The delta has instead been inundated with catastrophic superlatives: It is among the world's most densely cultivated lands, with one of the world's highest uses of fertilizers and highest levels of soil salinity."
68 The Aswan reservoir, Lake Nasser, also permits high levels of water loss through seepage and evaporation, contributing to increased soil salinity along the course of the river.
69
Water quality is especially important to Egypt because it is so dependent upon the Nile for agricultural production. Although Egypt has, over the last thirty years, substituted food imports (funded massively by the United States of America) for indigenous 71 Of course, Ethiopia has not previously exploited the Nile to support food production, depending instead upon rain-based agriculture. That trend is likely to change in the short term, so by expanding production and attempting to create more stable food supplies, Ethiopia may become more reliant on the Nile than is currently the case.
72
This brief sketch of geographical and hydrological factors suggests a classic case of international resource competition, especially given Egypt's high level of dependence upon the waters of the Nile. As will be shown, the competitive environment has been intensified by historical and legal factors, and by changing political dynamics affecting development options throughout the basin.
Historic Patterns of Competition and Control
To a significant degree, the political context in the Nile Basin is conditioned by the region's colonial history and the strategic concerns of its colonial powers. Control over, and competition for, the waters of the Nile were central preoccupations, pursued either through efforts to gain direct control over key areas, or through treaties designed to establish legal control over the Nile. The colonial patterns of competition and quest for control were subsequently replicated by the newly independent states in the region and the influence of a competitive legal environment continues to be felt.
Egypt's case exemplifies the tension between the desire for control and the reality of interdependence that underpins much of the geopolitics in the Nile Basin. An old saw runs "Egypt is the Nile and the Nile is Egypt."
73 The phrase is as misleading as it is accurate. While it encapsulates Egypt's dependence on the Nile and its aspirations for control over its waters, it fails to acknowledge the import of the Nile for other basin states. Throughout its long history, Egyptian civilization has fed on the lifeblood of the Nile. As noted above, contemporary Egypt remains strikingly dependent on Nile water for its very survival. Yet the same historical claim is made for Sudan, which despite being comparatively less dependent on the Nile than Egypt, nonetheless confers crucial importance on the River. Seventy seven percent of Sudan's water originates outside its borders and most of that is carried into the country by the Nile system. sources also have profound effects on at least seven other countries. 75 So, while the Nile may, in a very real sense, be Egypt, the Nile is also more than Egypt. However, a major part of the historical story of resource competition is framed by hegemonic claims for the protection of Egyptian interests, claims offered first on behalf of Egypt by the British, and more recently by Egyptians themselves.
As colonial "protector," Britain undertook a series of initiatives to ensure the almost unimpeded flow of Nile waters into Egypt. Indeed, it was the British who imposed a basin-wide regime to the benefit of Egypt, a regime that is only now undergoing significant change.
76 Although the hegemonic aspect of the regime is deeply problematic, it had the virtue of treating the entire Nile Basin as a unit, a feature that the modern "ecosystem approach" to water management seeks to recreate, albeit for fundamentally different reasons.
77 Believing initially that the main supply of Nile water came from the East African tropical lakes, Britain's first initiatives were concentrated in Central and Eastern Africa, particularly Uganda.
78
British efforts to protect the White Nile flow continued into the twentieth century with a 1906 British-Belgian agreement guaranteeing water flow from the Congo into the Nile Basin, and similar agreements with Italy and France regarding their colonial territories.
79
The most far-reaching agreement was the 1929 Nile Waters Agreement, a colonial treaty involving Britain, as the governing power in Sudan, and Egypt. Moreover, the Treaty contained no provision for renegotiation or automatic alteration in the face of changing physical or political conditions.
95 Another problem with the 1959 Treaty, one that is the root of much regional tension, is that while it is purely bilateral, it seeks to apportion the entire flow of the Nile to Egypt and Sudan, excluding the interests of any other riparian, notably Ethiopia.
96
The conclusion of the 1959 Treaty provided Egypt with the security it needed to undertake the construction of the Aswan High 99 It is now more likely that, if the project ever moves forward, the Sudanese themselves will need to exploit any water gains.
100
The Jonglei Canal Project was finally launched in 1978, but was suspended in 1984.
101 It was controversial from the start, not only because of arguments over potential environmental damage, but also because the scheme has been considered a pawn in the hands of the Northern Sudanese who seek to dominate the South and extract the advantages of the project without bearing its costs.
102 It has even been argued that the project helped ignite a civil war in Sudan that has been fought since the 1970s.
103
However, in recent years, the leader of the Southern rebellion, Dr. John Garang, has stated publicly that the Jonglei Canal Project should go forward as long as guarantees are provided that the local population and wildlife will be protected. As these statements were made on an "official visit" to Cairo, where Garang was soliciting Egyptian support for his cause 104 , it is hard to assess his sincerity. Whatever the real opinion of key actors, the war in Sudan has effectively halted the Jonglei Project, although it is rhetorically resurrected in ministerial pronouncements from time to time. 
110
In recent times, greater political stability and a modestly growing economy have allowed Ethiopia to plan two small hydroelectric projects and a series of micro-dam projects, largely for irrigation;
111 the micro-dam projects could reduce the flow of the Blue Nile and the Atbara, both of which flow into the Nile proper within Sudan. Creating new agricultural land will be increasingly important for the Ethiopians, as traditional farming in the highlands is adversely affected by environmental destruction, especially soil erosion due largely to deforestation.
112
Meanwhile, Egypt has gone ahead with ambitious irrigation plans of its own. Work is said to be underway on the Salaam Canal, designed to carry 12.5 million cubic meters of water per day from Lake Nasser to the northern Sinai in support of a huge resettlement scheme that will eventually bring some three million new inhabitants to the region.
113
The parallel New Valley Project will pump 4.94 billion cubic meters of water a year from 106 See Policies, supra note 62, at 386 -88; Krishna, supra note 2, at 33. As Waterbury states, Egypt is not a true hegemon because it cannot simply impose its desired solutions, but "it can coax and threaten its neighbors convincingly." Cooperation, supra note 76, at 53. 107 112 See, e.g., Whittington, supra note 65, at 167 -68. 113 Kendie, supra note 108. There is some dispute over whether the Egyptian government has actually begun construction. Lake Nasser to irrigate up to 250,000 hectares in new settlement areas in the Western Desert outside the Nile Valley, the traditional home to almost all of Egypt's population.
114
There simply is not enough water in the Nile to complete the irrigation plans of both Ethiopia and Egypt, much less to satisfy the ambitions of all the Nile riparians.
115
Waterbury and Whittington suggest that even with zero use by upstream riparians, the Egyptians would have to "find" roughly five billion cubic meters of water a year to meet the requirements of the New Valley Project. Egyptian planners suggest that this water can come from more efficient use of existing supplies, but such projections are wildly optimistic. Moreover, Egyptian projections are based on the continuing availability of the portion of Nile flow accorded to Egypt under the 1959 Treaty with Sudan. Such an assumption is untenable, given the rising need and capacity of Ethiopia to exploit its own water resources.
116
Given these social and political realities, combined with the physical limitations noted above, it is no surprise that the regime governing water apportionment and use in the Nile Basin has been purely competitive until recently. There exists a myriad of other factors inhibiting cooperation. Aside from concerns over water per se, there is a range of border disputes and political disagreements that have undermined cooperation among Nile riparians. Kenyan and Ugandan support for the rebel SPLA in southern Sudan has prompted tension, as has Sudanese support for the Lord's Day Army fighting Ugandan authorities in the northern parts of that country. Sudanese assistance to Islamic fundamentalists in Ethiopia has caused that government great concern, with similar issues clouding Egyptian-Sudanese relations.
117 Sudan was implicated in the assassination attempt on Egyptian President Mubarak during his 1995 visit to Ethiopia.
118 In turn, Egypt is said to have fostered regional instability, such as the most recent EthiopianEritrean border conflict, in order to maintain its position of strength among Nile Basin states.
119
Political pressures within the Nile states also discourage cooperative approaches. The regional distrust of Egypt and its hegemonic claims has already been mentioned. But the distrust is mutual. In one of the weekly opposition newspapers in Cairo, for instance, an article appeared in 1998 claiming that the United States and World Bank were about to loan $2.5 billion to Ethiopia "for the establishment of four giant dams on the Blue Nile . .
. thus threatening the flow of water to Egypt and Sudan."
120 The article inaccurately reported Ethiopian plans and the support that might be derived from external agencies. Finally, at a structural level, it is important to note that until recently, states along the Nile displayed few integrative activities or interests. Their economies were largely disconnected, with trade patterns related to colonial connections and the desire to link with developed countries of the North, rather than with other poor regional economies. As is obvious from the listing of endemic conflicts in this paragraph, there are no strategic alliances centered on the Nile or its basin.
121
Finally, a variety of additional reasons for non-cooperative behavior arise in the context of water distribution and use. First, interest in the Nile at a political level is highly disparate, with Egyptian reliance prompting intense strategic interest and all other states manifesting attitudes ranging from modest engagement to indifference.
122 Second, given limited resources and generally scarce technical expertise within water ministries, national water plans tend to be designed in a vacuum, with little provision for basin-wide activities or even for information gathering.
123 Third, until recently, the same resource and expertise problems ensured that many states along the Nile simply did not know what their water needs would be, and few had any clear understanding of available water resources within their countries.
124 Lack of knowledge on the ground also exacerbates latent distrust, especially vis-à-vis the Egyptians, who possess much more extensive technical capacity and can therefore dominate negotiations. Fourth, the historical pattern of bilateral agreements ignoring third party interests has bred legal confusion and has compounded the distrust among the Nile states. The unsettled and contradictory state of international water law over the last thirty years has also served to exacerbate competitive attitudes along the Nile. The evolution of the legal regime governing shared freshwater is discussed, but it is important to note here that the long unresolved tension and continuing coexistence of two seemingly incompatible legal principles, "equitable use" and "no significant harm," have allowed states to make entirely self-interested arguments, often in bad faith.
126 Recent changes and improvements in this "legal endowment," changes that begin to address the fundamental conflicts between upstream and downstream states, 127 are one of the reasons for a new, more cooperative spirit in Nile Basin relationships.
Moves Toward Cooperation Along the Nile
The last few years have witnessed a remarkable shift in the tone and substance of stateto-state relationships along the Nile. This shift can be demonstrated if one adopts the narrative approach advocated in Allan's discursive framework of water politics.
128 From dire predictions of inevitable "water wars" to pronouncements of fraternal bonds and cooperative activity, from unilateralism to multilateral institutional development, the regime governing the waters of the Nile is evolving in surprising ways -that is, surprising if one relies only on self-interest and relative power as causal variables in explaining the behavior of states. The outlines of the new regime are emerging from patterns of interaction that have been fostered both by Nile states and external agents over the last two decades.
The story of change begins in the early 1980s, with a series of overlapping initiatives. hydrometeorological studies (the Hydromet Project) was re-launched in the early 1980s. The goal was to provide a baseline set of measurements of water availability and future needs affecting the White Nile in and around lakes Victoria, Kyoga, and Albert.
132
Despite the political crises in the region, a treaty was concluded in 1977, 133 to which Uganda acceded in 1981, creating a basin-wide management regime for the Kagera River.
134
The more ambitious UNDUGU --meaning "brotherhood" in Swahili--135 group was founded at Egypt's behest in 1983, drawing together all Nile riparians except, again, Ethiopia and Kenya. As has been typical of all but the most recent attempts at furthering basin-wide cooperation, these two states participated only as observers.
136 UNDUGU's unrealistic goal was to foster economic, social, cultural, and technical ties among the Nile riparians, leading to the foundation of a permanent sub-regional economic organization. The group brought together high level political actors, including Ministers of Foreign Affairs.
137 From an Egyptian perspective, the group was probably imagined as an exercise in hegemonic influence.
138 From a Pan-African perspective, UNDUGU was part of the failed drive towards "self-reliance and African inter-dependence. The creation of UNDUGU has not, in and of itself, led to significant concrete interaction among the riparian states, much less to coordinated economic initiatives. However, an UNDUGUbrokered call for a plan of action on economic development, including shared water, was to be addressed in other processes during the following decade.
In 1992, an intergovernmental Technical Cooperation Committee for the promotion of development and environmental protection on the Nile (TECCONILE) was established.
139 Even with the strong technical focus, Ethiopia and Kenya again refused to join as members because they deemed the framework for the organization to be inadequate as it did not address the fundamental equitable concerns of water 132 EL-ATAWY, supra note 55, at 50; Caponera, supra note 49, at 655; Elhance, supra note 50, at 80. 133 Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and Development of the Kagera River Basin (The Rusumo Treaty), Aug. 24, 1977, Rwanda -Burundi -Tanz., 1089 U.N.T.S. 165. 134 Okidi, supra note 83, at 322, 338. 135 Ibrahim, supra note 56, at 334. 136 Id. 137 AHMED, supra note 76, at 95 -96. 138 Waterbury argues that UNDUGU and other related Egyptian initiatives were part of a strategy (rooted in Egyptian hegemonic aspirations) that sought to create "multi-good bargaining situations" more likely to result in agreement than negotiations purely devoted to water issues. Cooperation, supra note 76, at 51 -52. 139 141 It envisioned twenty-two projects, grouped into five categories of activities ("components"), with an estimated cost of $100 million.
142
Within component "D" on "Regional Cooperation," the Action Plan contemplated "the establishment of a basin-wide, multidisciplinary framework for legal and institutional arrangements" (Project D-3) . 143 However, very little implementation occurred under the Action Plan as originally conceived, 144 in part because of resource constraints, and in part because of continuing competitive behavior among the basin states. The Action Plan was subsequently reviewed and, in 1999, it was superseded by a revised program, the Nile River Basin Strategic Action Program. In the same year, the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) was launched to replace TECCONILE.
145
Before turning to the NBI and the most recent developments, it is worth describing the "Nile 2002 Conferences," a further process designed to promote basin-wide cooperation on shared freshwater. This process, when linked to an evolving normative framework, has played an important role in changing the political climate along the Nile. The first conference was held in 1993 in Aswan, Egypt, and yearly conferences have been held since in various basin states. 146 The Conferences have been organized around the theme of comprehensive cooperation, and typically take the form of sessions devoted to individual papers canvassing issues of urgency, followed by the presentation of "country papers" sharing information on the challenges faced by each of the riparians. 147 In addition, time is allotted for open discussion. 148 All basin states have sent participants to the conferences, though for some time Burundi, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Kenya insisted that they were merely "observers".
149 One of the central advantages of the Nile 2002 series is its relative independence from immediate political calculations. In the closing session of the 1996 Conference in Kampala, one delegate noted that the process had not been "captured" by governments. The discussions were therefore more "direct and open" than would have been the case if the sessions were formally conceived of as negotiations.
150
It should be noted that discussions at the first and second Nile 2002 Conferences fed into the TECCONILE process, helping to structure the Nile River Basin Action Plan.
Although the Nile 2002 series was conceived as a "technical" forum, its discussions assumed a decidedly normative turn. Papers often canvassed the legal status of riparian relationships (including the continued vitality of "colonial treaties"), and issues concerning the proper legal framework for apportionment (equitable utilization versus avoidance of harm) were raised in public debate. The prevalence of normative issues has not always been well received. At the 1996 conference in Kampala, an Egyptian delegate complained early in the sessions that Nile 2002 was supposed to be about technical issues, so why was there so much talk about law, even from non-lawyers? This concern was echoed, on the last day of the Conference, by the Sudanese delegation.
151 Such reactions were predictable, as these discussions were taking place just as the international law framework for apportionment of shared freshwater was being actively debated in other fora and the stakes were therefore high.
152
The Nile Basin Initiative So far, this essay has traced various processes, none of which can be said to have led to a breakthrough from competition to cooperation. Until 1999, one could claim nothing more than a modest improvement in communications and a broader rhetorical commitment to cooperative behavior. Even the Nile 2002 Conferences had few tangible results. There was no joint management, or even coordinated planning and development, of Nile water resources. What may prove to be a breakthrough was the creation of the NBI in February 1999 and the official launching of its secretariat in Entebbe, Uganda in September 1999. 153 The key development is active Ethiopian involvement in the Initiative. Long a careful bystander or active critic of efforts at coordination, Ethiopia, 148 Id. 149 Swain, supra note 1, at 691. 150 Comments from the Floor, Nile 2002 Conference (Feb. 26 -28, 1996) (on file with the authors). It may be more accurate to say that the Conferences have not been "captured" by Ministries of Foreign Affairs and by Offices of Prime Ministers and Presidents. Most of the delegates are from "government." However, for the most part, they are from ministries and agencies devoted expressly to issues of water development and environmental protection. The shared background of most of the delegates goes some way to explaining the progress made in the Nile 2002 conference series. 151 Comments of an Egyptian and a Sudanese delegate, Nile 2002 Conference (Feb. 26 -28, 1996) (on file with the authors). 152 See infra notes 193-204 and accompanying text. 153 See the press reports cited supra note 8; see also NBI Overview, supra note 10; see also Nile Basin Initiative Launched at Ceremony in Uganda, supra note 9. through its increasing engagement, signals real hope for joint water planning and management along the Nile.
154 Significantly, unlike any of the previous initiatives, the NBI has engaged all key state actors in the Nile Basin. Moreover, the Initiative is consciously designed to engage parallel technical and political processes, with regular communication between the two.
155
As noted earlier, the NBI and its Nile River Basin Strategic Action Program have superseded TECCONILE and the Nile Basin Action Plan, respectively. The NBI is intended to promote "sustainable socio-economic development through the equitable utilization of, and benefit from, the common Nile Basin water resources," 156 and hopes have been raised that a comprehensive Nile treaty, replacing the 1959 Egyptian-Sudan agreement, might emerge. Indeed, the NBI is viewed as a "transitional mechanism" to facilitate basin-wide discourse until a "permanent cooperative framework" is put in place. 157 To this end, the NBI's Strategic Action Program comprises a "Shared Vision Program" which is designed to provide a basin-wide framework for action, and "Subsidiary Action Programs" which are to generate joint development projects at the sub-basin level. 158 The NBI places greater emphasis on sub-basin initiatives than the 1995 Action Plan, which acknowledged the need for sub-basin activities in specific cases but clearly emphasized a basin-wide process.
159
The Strategic Action Program is guided by the belief that "real action on the ground" is key to the success of the NBI and that basin-wide cooperation is best promoted by "taking decisions at the lowest appropriate level." 160 Notwithstanding the emphasis on subsidiarity, the NBI's Shared Vision Program does encompass, in its revised form, most of the basin-wide components of the earlier plan. The five broad action themes, designed to promote the shared vision, are: cooperative framework; confidence building and stakeholder involvement; socio-economic, environmental, and sectoral analyses; development and investment planning; and applied training. 161 The "cooperative framework" theme of the Shared Vision Program, supported by UNDP, is in fact the continuation of the earlier plan's "Project D-3" on legal and institutional matters.
162
Until that framework is established, sub-basin activities under the NBI are governed by a "common understanding" of the basin states regarding several implementation guidelines. These include guidelines on the need for involvement of all affected parties in the planning of sub-basin initiatives, and on the need to build on "principles of equitable utilization, no significant harm, and cooperation." 163 The guidelines also call for "solutions both that have benefits for all involved and distribute benefits, costs, and risks equitably as well as use resources efficiently and protect the environment."
164
Work by a panel of experts on the highly sensitive issues arising in the context of the framework has been proceeding quietly, and secretly, over the last few years. There are indications that significant progress is being made. In early August 2000, the water resources ministers from all ten Nile Basin states, including Eritrea as an observer, met in Khartoum, Sudan, to review the panel of experts' final report on the framework. 165 At the conclusion of the meeting, Osman el Tom, vice-chairman of Sudan's water resources authority, reported "remarkable convergence toward future cooperation." Disagreements remained "mainly on the principle of prior notification of planned measures and the state of the existing agreements under the new cooperative framework."
166
Notwithstanding the unresolved issues in the cooperative framework text, decisive progress was made with respect to a package of cooperative projects in the Nile Basin. In March 2001, the Nile Council of Ministers of Water Affairs endorsed several basin-wide Shared Vision Program projects and several sub-basin projects, the latter to be undertaken within the NBI's Eastern Nile (ENSAP) and Nile Equatorial Lakes (NELSAP) sub-programs. 167 According to the Ethiopian Water Affairs Minister, this development constitutes a "watershed agreement" and "reflects the new spirit of cooperation between the countries of the Nile."
168 Building on the agreement reached on the cooperative projects, a new International Consortium for Cooperation on the Nile (ICCON) met for the first time in June 2001. ICCON brings together "the riparian countries of the Nile, the international donor community, public and private lenders, as well as other interested parties such as civil society, professional organizations, and NGOs" to work in support of the NBI. 169 A consultative group of interested donors, a sub-group of ICCON organized by the World Bank at the request of the Nile Council of Ministers, was also launched. 170 The consultative group approved an initial grant of $140 million, while further financial assistance for the NBI's Shared Vision Program in the amount of $3 billion is contemplated.
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The obvious question is: what prompted this promising set of developments, particularly the significant change of attitude on the part of previously reluctant participants, such as Ethiopia? Various explanations can be offered, not singular answers but rather a constellation of influences promoting changing patterns of behavior. The interest of this essay is in demonstrating the distinctive explanatory force of law without failing to acknowledge the importance of other factors with which legal norms co-exist and interact.
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The Role of Legal Norms in the Nile Basin Regime This essay began with the observation international law's actual or potential contributions to promoting cooperation in the Nile Basin tend to be seen as limited at best. Specifically, the treaties that do apply to the Nile are perceived as having neither addressed water problems in the basin nor defused the potential for conflict. 173 Further, the United Nations Watercourses Convention, 174 adopted in 1997 to provide a global normative framework for shared freshwater, is viewed by many observers as unsuited to resolving the issues that arise in the Nile Basin. 175 Finally, while policy-makers in the region have been contemplating the development of a basin-wide legal framework, its role tends to be seen largely as one of formalizing pre-existing agreements and enshrining states' entitlements.
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Legal norms have actually been influential in molding the evolving Nile Basin regime, but the influence until recently has been such that conflictual rather than cooperative behavior has been promoted. Within the last decade, legal norms have been recast and the contemporary pattern seems more oriented to the promotion of cooperation. This argument, drawing upon the interactional understanding of law outlined earlier in this paper, posits that law's influence derives from three interrelated characteristics. First, like all norms, law has the power to shape the individual and collective identities of states. Second, it both enables and constrains international discourse by establishing what counts as persuasive argument or rhetoric. Further, its inherent and specific form of legitimacy enhances the persuasiveness of legal conclusions.
The effect of the historic treaties is first studied by turning to the capacity of norms to shape identity. Wendt notes that norms and other intersubjective structures have the capacity either to "inhibit or facilitate the emergence of dynamics of collective identity formation." 177 Wendt goes on to argue that:
. . . conflicts are also intersubjective phenomena, partly in virtue or [sic] rules shared by the parties . . . but especially in virtue of shared perceptions of issues and threat . . . The greater the degree of conflict in a system, the more the states will fear each other and defend egoistic identities by engaging in relative gains thinking and resisting the factors that might undermine it." 178 Drawing on cognitive psychology, other constructivist IR theorists suggest that, even absent objective conflict and competition, language and the categories it employs can promote the formation of distinct identities.
179 In this vein, to the extent that norms articulate "categories," they can contribute to the formation or hardening of separate, competitive identities. By the same token, norms can promote the construction of collective identities and collective definitions of interests by framing processes that foster mutual understanding. Through interaction, actors can learn "to see themselves as others do," and through cooperation, they can gradually change their beliefs about themselves and "internalize" their new, collective identity.
180 It is important to emphasize, however, Seen from this standpoint, the historic treaties regarding the Nile display a variety of features that limit their ability to foster cooperation in the basin. These treaties have not addressed the water problems in the region and are ill-suited to guide future relations among basin states. This conclusion is not surprising, given the strategic concern that prompted past treaty-making with respect to the Nile: securing control over or access to its waters. Moreover, the various treaties have served not only to entrench the competitive attitudes described above, but, more fundamentally, have reinforced, even encouraged, separate and competitive identities among the Nile Basin states.
A first salient feature of the existing treaty-based law is the pattern of bilateral treatymaking. This pattern has undercut the emergence of basin-wide shared understandings and the evolution of a collective identity of the riparian states as basin states. This is so in part because bilateral treaty-making did not provide opportunities for basin-wide interaction and trust-building. Second, the treaty terms, focused as they were upon allocation of states' shares in Nile waters, actually served to foster the distinct and egoistic identities of the Nile states. This certainly applies to the relations between those states that had concluded agreements and those that remained excluded. Since the treaty terms ultimately served to articulate separate or even competing interests, it would seem to be equally true for the relations between treaty parties. This reading applies with particular force to the 1959 agreement between Egypt and Sudan, which sought to enshrine acquired rights of the parties. Third, the lack of provision for adaptation of the various Nile treaties' terms to changing circumstances forestalled opportunities for the transformation of the shared competitive understandings of the parties. Similarly, the very limited procedural frameworks, such as technical cooperation committees, established by these treaties provided little opportunity for fostering mutual learning and understanding.
Similar to law's influence on identity formation, law's control over what counts as persuasive argument has also played out in essentially negative terms within the Nile Basin. The legal positions of various Nile riparians concerning international water law have echoed the conflictual patterns just described. The bilateral treaties have permitted the adoption of legal rhetoric that is entirely self-serving, fostering competition rather than cooperation. The central Egyptian claim to its current Nile water draw has been based upon reliance and historical usage. For generations the Egyptian government has stressed in various intergovernmental fora that states are entitled "to the quantities of water which they customarily took from that watercourse" and that the "extent of their dependence on the watercourse" should be the critical factor in apportioning draws among riparian states.
184 A related argument is that the "sunk costs" already expended by Egypt in harnessing the Nile accord it a veritable "property right to the resource."
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These claims are categorically rejected by all other Nile riparians, 186 with the exception of Sudan, linked as it is to Egypt in the symbiotic (if unequal) relationship defined by the terms of the 1959 bilateral treaty. As a downstream state like Egypt, Sudan has itself embraced claims of historical use and reliance to resist the limitation of its access that might result from water projects in Ethiopia.
187
The failure of the historic treaties to foster cooperation is further explained by their lack of legitimacy, the third characteristic of persuasive law. Legal legitimacy depends upon congruence with underlying social practice and internal characteristics of fair process. Obviously, the mere fact that all of the treaties are bilateral, and in no way coordinated, means that they cannot legitimately be seen to govern all of the Nile waters. Moreover, an assessment of legitimacy within the framework of interactional international law reveals why this is so and points to other delegitimizing factors affecting the Nile Basin regime. First, to take the example of the Egyptian-Sudan Treaty of 1959, it asks the entirely unreasonable by purporting to divide all of the flow of the Nile between only two of the ten riparians. Also, because it contained no provision for reconsideration of the water allocation, at some point in time, the Treaty terms would come to ask the impossible, for the flow cannot match the assigned quotas. Furthermore, the fact that a shared resource crossing many boundaries is regulated by a series of bilateral treaties undercuts the notion of transparency, because there is no framework for multilateral information sharing. Even more pointedly, actors with clear interests in decisions on activities that affect Nile waters are simply excluded from the regime. For generations, claims have been made that the colonial era treaties are not binding upon riparian states. These claims are also rooted in legitimacy concerns. Inevitably, a treaty negotiated by a colonial power has trouble meeting the test of social congruence because the "real" parties are not present at the negotiations. To the extent that any "shared understandings" evolved, they are not shared by post-colonial governments, let alone by the citizenry of newly emerging states.
The framework of international water law has reinforced separate and competitive identities among Nile Basin states. It has also served to reinforce self-interested, and ultimately unconvincing, legal arguments. 188 Until recently, the unresolved relationship between two core principles of international water law, 'equitable utilization' and 'no significant harm,' has allowed states to maintain irreconcilable positions. In brief terms, the basic approach of international water law has been rooted in these core rules and in the underlying idea of mutual limitation of sovereign rights. Under the principle of equitable utilization, riparian states are entitled to use international watercourses in a "reasonable" and "equitable" manner. 189 What is reasonable and equitable must be determined in each individual case and depends upon various factors, none of which has inherent priority. These factors range from the geography, hydrology, and climate of the basin, to economic, social, and demographic factors, to existing uses or availability of alternative resources. 190 The mutual limitation approach also dictates the rule that a state's right to use its territory is limited by the duty not to cause significant harm to another state. 191 This rule not only is part of international water law but also constitutes a cornerstone of international environmental law.
192
Although specific geographical, political, and economic contexts no doubt shape legal discourse, the equitable utilization principle is typically advanced by upper riparians, such as Ethiopia, looking to alter or increase the uses of an international watercourse. Lower riparians, such as Egypt, have tended to argue that the right to equitable utilization finds its limitation in the duty not to cause significant transboundary harm. 193 Upper riparians, in turn, countered that this argument would amount to a system of prior appropriation and effectively preclude their own development. Therefore, the argument goes, it is the principle of equitable utilization that ultimately takes priority, with downstream harm being merely one factor to be considered in the determination of what is equitable and reasonable.
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The United Nations Watercourses Convention adopted in 1997, is because it includes the latest attempt to grapple with the relationship between the two principles. Its provisions on the equitable utilization (Articles 5, 6) and no harm (Article 7) rules, inevitably, were a delicate compromise. While Article 7(1) does require states, in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, "to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States," this duty is merely one of due diligence.
195 Further, Article 7(2) suggests that, where significant harm is caused by diligent conduct, it is lawful so long as it results from activities that remain within a state's right to reasonable and equitable use under Article 5. This means that, in the vast majority of cases, issues of significant harm will ultimately be resolved through a balancing of interests under the equitable utilization rules. This result, in turn, is tempered by a requirement that the state causing the harm consult with the affected state "to eliminate or mitigate such harm, and where appropriate, discuss the question of compensation."
196
At first glance, the Watercourses Convention would seem to perpetuate the competitive paradigm. Its substantive core rules remain grounded in the mutual limitation of sovereign rights. The focus is not on identifying and promoting shared understandings or common interests but on demarcating individual, separate entitlements. As a result, the Convention's terms may promote the maintenance, or even the reinforcement, of the separate identities of riparian states. This is true to the extent that the Convention fails to offer a sufficiently developed alternative conceptual framework that could facilitate the formation of collective identities.
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Nonetheless, rather than perpetuate the old paradigm, the Convention may in fact accomplish the opposite. The Convention's terms effectively 'neutralize' the previously competing rules. Given the circular nature of the regime established by Articles 5 and 7, which ties the equitable utilization and no harm rules together without resolving the priority issue, neither rule can any longer be argued as overriding. The Watercourses Convention deprives each side of convincing legal arguments for the priority of their claims. Upper and lower riparians are forced to re-examine their entrenched positions and to engage with one another to find fair solutions to their disagreements.
Through its deliberately open-ended equitable utilization framework, the Convention provides little in 195 The Watercourses Convention requires states to "take all appropriate measures." Watercourses Convention, supra note 18, art. 7(1). 196 Article 7(2) of the Watercourses Convention, reads in full:
Where significant harm is nevertheless caused to another watercourse State, the State whose use causes such harm shall, in the absence of agreement to such use, take all appropriate measures having due regard for the provisions of articles 5 and 6, in consultation with the affected State, to eliminate or mitigate such harm, and where appropriate, discuss the question of compensation. Id. art. 7(2). 197 The individualized effects of the Convention remain true despite the Convention's procedural provisions: Articles 8, 9, 11, 12, 15 -18, 24. While designed to promote various forms of cooperation, the procedural provisions are limited by the substantive framework. Furthermore, this assessment holds irrespective of the fact that the Convention does contain a number of provisions that alert states to common concern: Articles 20 -23 contain various environmental and ecosystem protection obligations. Watercourses Convention, supra note 18, arts. 20 -23. Albeit tentatively, these provisions do move the Convention beyond the "mutual limitation" paradigm. The ecosystem protection duties in Articles 20 and 22 and the duty to protect the marine environment in Article 23 arise regardless of interferences with another riparian's sovereign rights. Nonetheless, given the predominance of the regime framed by Articles 5 to 7, it is not clear that the Convention's environmental protection provisions can significantly change the flavor of riparian relations that it otherwise models. See also Ecosystem Law, supra note 77, at 58 -65 (commenting on the Draft Articles). might have been possible to reconcile the rules of "no significant harm" and "equitable utilization," the normative framework contained no principles to guide states toward such reconciliation. This failure is manifest in the longstanding and inconclusive "priority" debate. Effectively, the two rules precluded the structuring of a legal framework that was internally consistent. Instead, states were permitted to offer up arguments that were incapable of coordination and reconciliation. The legal framework encouraged contradiction and invited abusive claims to rights. The contradiction in the two fundamental principles has been effectively erased through their melding in the Watercourses Convention. Of course, the influence of the traditional rules cannot be erased overnight.
205 Therefore, the new challenge to legitimacy will be to foster social practices along the Nile that have the capacity to generate adherence to emerging cooperative principles of water law, such as sustainable development, precaution and intergenerational equity.
206
Informal Interaction Among Basin States
Finally, this Section evaluates the various informal processes that have taken place in the Nile Basin since the 1980s. Superficially, endeavors such as TECCONILE, the Nile 2002 Conferences, the Nile River Basin Action Plan, and the NBI might seem to suggest a move away from law. Conventional wisdom among many policy-makers in the region and academic observers has been that law has no constructive contribution to make at this stage. Rather, lawyers and legal arguments have been seen by many as hindering progress.
207 Law's moment, then, tends to be seen as coming at the end of a successful negotiation process when law is called upon to formalize the agreed outcome and render it "binding."
208 From an interactional perspective, this view is plainly wrong. The "final" legal framework is already emerging in the patterns of interaction among the riparians. These patterns are gradually re-shaping basin states' identities, shifting the parameters of persuasive argument and, crucially, promoting enhanced legitimacy for emerging legal norms.
The point is not that the informal processes of interaction are themselves "legal" institutions, but rather that the cooperative frameworks they engender are part of what helps law emerge. At the same time, existing and crystallizing legal norms affect the interaction of states and other actors within informal processes. Law is both generative of changes in interaction and generated by further interaction. The informal Nile processes have aspired to promote the kind of interaction, trust-building, and mutual learning that are crucial to the emergence of shared understandings which in turn must underlie any effective normative evolution
The NBI process and the work on the "Cooperative Framework" do seem to mark a breakthrough on the path toward cooperation in the Nile Basin. Although promises of new development funding from the World Bank and other donors are relevant material inducements toward greater cooperation, dollars alone would not have been enough to prompt regime change. The developments culminating in the NBI evidence the emergence of modest shared understandings and norms that have helped to prompt concrete regime evolution. For example, the Nile 2002 and other related initiatives are all grounded in the notion of basin-wide cooperation. While the commitment to this approach was tentative initially, it is now the very underpinning of the NBI and its shared vision. This commitment is significant not just for hydrological reasons but also because it can help shape a collective identity of the Nile states as basin states and promote the identification of collective interests.
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By the same token, the emergence of a basin identity and shared understandings as to basin-wide interests will serve to constrain Nile states from making entirely selfinterested arguments. This process can be further assisted by norms that serve to recast perceived reasons for conflict or competition into reasons for cooperation. For example, under the long standing mutual limitation paradigm of international water law, water scarcity in the Nile Basin was a matter of competing sovereign interests, whereas it is now beginning to be recognized as requiring cooperation. A significant contribution to overcoming the competitive approach was made by the drawing together of the equitable utilization and no harm principles, as now reflected in the NBI. In addition, concepts such as sustainable development, benefit sharing, or environmental protection provide important normative guidance by directly focusing upon positive outcomes, best achieved through cooperation, not competition. These emerging norms, all reflected in the NBI, help guide the interaction of the Basin states by rendering purely competitive arguments, even in the context of water scarcity, untenable or, at least, unconvincing.
Inclusiveness and transparency of process are the hallmarks of recent Nile Basin initiatives. Indeed, the main goal of each of the processes, at least initially, was to involve all riparians in discourse. ICCON goes further by seeking to involve "civil society and NGOs" in basin-wide discussions. The subject matter was less important, although there was an explicit avoidance of discussions rooted in assertions of rights. An important thread in all gatherings was the principle of equal access and equal participation, furthering the goals of both inclusiveness and transparency. All states had access to information, ideas, and perspectives. This became "shared knowledge." On the basis of this shared knowledge, it became possible to discuss concepts such as sustainable development without viewing them as foreign impositions, bargaining chips, or ploys. The processes of discussion were imbued with legitimacy that enhanced the persuasiveness of the products of discussion. As a crucial further step, regular ministerial-level meetings complemented the technical discussions within the NBI. Special effort was expended to ensure that the technical discussions were shared with all relevant ministries and then fed into the inter state negotiations. Thus, legitimacy generated at the technical level radiated into the political arena. In turn, as political leaders were convinced of the need for cooperation, their commitment reinforced the technical processes.
A further key development was the recognition, through the NBI process, that only a shared basin-wide set of normative principles would legitimize particular project activities by ensuring a perspective that was inclusive of the identities and interests of all basin states. At the same time, the states recognized that regional or sub-basin projects were more likely than basin-wide projects to generate concrete results that would, in turn, lend greater legitimacy to the governing principles by showing them to be effective. In sum, it was not possible to promote "action on the ground" before a shared framework of principles had been elaborated and inclusive processes of discussion had been created. But to insist on basin-wide cooperation on all issues and projects was unrealistic, if not impossible. So, perhaps ironically, it was a basin-wide, completely inclusive process of normative evolution that cut the Gordian knot to allow Nile states to move toward concrete cooperative projects, many of which will be undertaken at the sub-basin level.
The recent informal processes of discussion on the Nile cannot be appropriately characterized as either 'cheap talk' or purely strategic bargaining. Rather, they have begun to involve genuine arguments, geared toward reaching common understandings and reasoned consensus.
210 They are interactional processes of lawmaking, contributing simultaneously to shaping state identities and building legitimacy.
211 Law's contribution is not simply formal, adding "legal varnish" to a pre-established strategic bargain, nor does it solely provide "bindingness" at the end of the day.
212 Law has already helped to make agreement possible and has generated the sense of adherence to mutually constructed norms that serve as the basis of their persuasiveness. 210 See Risse, supra note 32, at 8 -9. Risse views "rhetoric" in the limited sense of "strategic." The need for participants to "argue," in Risse's terms, rather than bargain, resonates with Fuller's assertion that:
The good negotiator [in the negotiation of a complex agreement] must not only make a genuine effort to understand the declared aims of the opposing party, but must be capable of some sympathetic participation in those aims...To serve his principal well he must identify himself with the opposing party...In this reconciliation of altruism and self-interest there is revealed...a more mature conception of morality.... Lon Fuller, Irrigation and Tyranny, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1021, 1034 (1965) . 211 On legal legitimacy in an interactional framework, see International Law and Constructivism, supra note 14, at 66. 212 See Fuller, supra note 210. He concludes:
Problems concerned with the sharing of water supplies and the joint utilization of river systems are inherently unsuited to adjudicative solution, involving as they do a complex interplay of diverse interests. Only those who know those interests intimately, who can feel their way to the best reciprocal adjustment of them, are competent to find a truly satisfactory solution. If this is not the easiest way to hydraulic peace, it is surely the best. Id. at 1042.
Conclusion
Is there a role for law in shaping the Nile Basin regime? The answer is emphatically yes. But law's effects are not adequately captured in the descriptions of positivist lawyers, most IR theorists, or even of some Nile negotiators. This essay's goal is to show how an interactional understanding of law illuminates both the promise and the limitations of law as a factor that influences the evolution of the Nile Basin regime.
This essay does not suggest that law is a fully autonomous, let alone controlling, influence in international society generally or on the Nile specifically. A variety of factors, including factors relating to a reassessment of material interests, interact to prompt regime change. The claim is simply that law is one of these factors, and that it possesses independent explanatory and normative force that should not be ignored. Therefore, law's persuasive influence is neither inevitable nor inevitably positive.
As illustrated through the analysis of the various strands of the evolving Nile Basin legal framework, law has exerted influence because of its ability to shape the identities of states and to guide international discourse by demarcating what counts as persuasive argument. Law's ability to generate its own adherence and to persuade Nile states depends upon the extent to which it meets specific, internal standards of legitimacy and is congruent with the shared understandings and practices in the Basin. 213 When these conditions are not present, law cannot fulfill its constructive role.
Finally, an assessment of the various informal processes in the Nile Basin illustrates that norms can generate adherence even if they are not formally binding. This is not to suggest that all attempts to create such formally binding rules, through the negotiation of explicit agreements, are misguided. In fact, in a setting such as the Nile, it ultimately may be necessary to craft formal rules of apportionment and other rights. Such formal rules must be rooted in interactional processes that frame persuasive argument, that help construct identities and legitimacy, and that involve all relevant actors. 214 Binding law can emerge only within settings where actors have agreed upon parameters for their interaction and have developed certain basic understandings about what they hope to achieve together. It follows that law cannot, by simply declaring a formal rule, ensure adherence.
The insights drawn together in this essay help explain the limitations of the older Nile treaties and the possible contributions of the law of international watercourses. Most significantly, however, they help explain why the slowly evolving processes in the Nile Basin, such as those embedded in Nile 2002 Conferences or the NBI, are crucial to the emergence and evolution of legal norms. Moreover, the interactional view of law that the essay sketches illuminates that law's role in the Nile Basin is confined neither to formalizing agreements previously reached through purely strategic bargaining, nor to establishing explicit entitlements. Rather, emerging legal norms, such as those related to sustainable, basin-wide management of the Nile, already serve to articulate common understandings and to influence -not control -the evolution of previously entrenched positions.
Along the Nile, law has played a significant role for generations, often in negative ways, by reinforcing competition and conflict. Law's persuasive influence has shifted recently, both through the elaboration of a less oppositional regime of international water law, and through the creation of various processes that have fostered regional collaboration. These processes have encouraged environmental learning, have begun to build a basin-wide identity among Nile riparians, and have re-oriented normative discourse. Normative frameworks to promote cooperation have greater legitimacy today than at any time in the Nile's recent history. If law continues to play its current facilitative role in shaping interaction, prospects are good for the elaboration of a comprehensive approach to Nile management. 175 (1998) . Rather, the argument is that emphasis upon the elaboration of binding rules may not be appropriate or beneficial in the early stages of regime building. Indeed, an initial contextual regime, such as a framework agreement, including the soft principles that it articulates, is usually an essential precursor for the development of binding rules. Fuentes, therefore, misses the point when she critiques Brunnée and Toope's point by stating: "What would be Mexico's reaction if the obligation assumed by the United States to deliver 1,500,000 acre-feet of water from the Colorado were to be characterized as 'soft'?" Id. at 175. Binding apportionment rules may well be needed, but this need is not necessarily best addressed through the immediate enactment of formally binding rules.
